Foam Shown to lead to Columbia's Demise

[RedRed]

http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?art...89EEDF&catID=2

Perhaps this will shut up those who complain about 'enviro-loonies'

EVERY SINGLE shuttle flight had foam loss - NASA 'didnt worry about it'!

it had 'little' to do the particular compund, it was the method of application.

As also pointed out in the full article (I have it on paper only, unfortunately), the prime problem with NASA is that there is no mechanism of engineers who are watching the situation to make suggestions for improvements or to call warnings to their superiors - unless they suppy 'seven inches of paperwork to support their claim - which no engineers has the resources to do' (quote form later in the article)

NASA seems to have lost its way if its being buyied in paper...

Regards
RedRed

[Dr Mordrid]

Yes, SMALL particles and chunks broke off before they changed the formulation. Once they did change the formulation the size and frequency of breakoffs increased and hence the danger

Small particles or golfball sized pieces are very different from a piece the size of a briefcase when hitting the wing at 500 mph.

Dr. Mordrid

[cjolley]

Originally posted by Dr Mordrid
Yes, SMALL particles and chunks broke off before they changed the formulation. Once they did change the formulation the size and frequency of breakoffs increased and hence the danger

Small particles or golfball sized pieces are very different from a piece the size of a briefcase when hitting the wing at 500 mph.

Dr. Mordrid

Is that your engineering analysis?
Or are you doing the same thing NASA did?
For all you or I know, it was the change in the way the compound was applied and not the compound it's self that lead to the problem.

As far as I can recall, no NASA facilities were forcibly taken over by Enviro-whackos.
NASA's job is to do real study of the effects of changes like the change of insulation compound, not just say: "Oh, well, it will probably work.".
chuck

[mmp121]

Originally posted by cking4


http://www.insightmag.com/news/449260.html

Not that I know if it is or is not, someone's bound to suggest that the website/mag/writer is a right wing conservative.

[cjolley]

Wow, that site is like a giant wingnut circle-jerk.
Icky, but hard to look away from.
chuck

PS Beat me to it....
I read quite a bit of it. It is...

[cjolley]

Originally posted by cking4
I'd much rather see you refute what is stated in this article with some information supporting your own point
of view, as opposed to attempting to refute it with name-calling.

Stick to the subject, Chuck. Why do you believe NASA changed the insulation material?

The question is not: "why did NASA change the insulation material"

The question is "why did NASA not not change the insulation material"

That is my whole point.
If I wrote them and said I had evironmental conserns and would they please change from LOX/H2* for fuel to compressed air and water. what would their response be?

People with technical responsibility need to get things right.
Especialy if lives and/or huge sums of money depend on their analysis of a situation.


chuck

* Solid booster fuel would have been a better example
I was trying to talk on the phone and type at the same time, sorry about that.

[cjolley]

To be more specific:
I'm sure that NASA gets pressure from politicians, salesmen, cost accountants, managers and etc all the time.
The entire job of the engineering team on change control is to vet the change suggestions, from whatever source, and issue a disposition.
Unless there was a way to make the new foam work correctly then the proper response should have been "denied".
In this case the change was not analyzed correctly.
It doesn't matter where or why the suggestion was made.
It could just as easily have been a suggestion by accounting to substitute grade 8 bolts for Titanium ones some where in the system.
Some ones job was to make sure it would work before the change.
The default needs to be NO until proven good, not YES until proven bad.
That in a nutshell is the cause of both shuttle losses.

chuck

[Sethos]

Wow, that's incredeble, and yes very much a shame to loose those seven lives...

~Sethos

[RedRed]

Actually, people, the REAL REPORT is out today...

Give it a read... (I will as soon as I can - summary at least)

However, the press briefing todays claims that the bulk of the issues stems from 'poor management and a cavalier attutide to risk-taking' - no mention of 'sub standard' envirowhachy styrine yet!

RedRed

[RedRed]

CJ has hit the nail on the head, though....

IF the foam was a poor substitute, someone should have said so, and been listen to.

It is the flight engineers job to look into these things to improve on flights - not just to ignore them....

I remember the first shuttle flight well -something like 30 tiles fell off! The 'glue' got better... That should be the engineers job.

Its managements job to listen and fight the battles, if fighting has to be done.


RedRed

[paulcs]

Here's a link to the CAIB site with a second link to the report in PDF format:

http://www.caib.us/news/report/default.html

Paul

[paulcs]

Executive Summary of Shuttle Report

The text of the executive summary of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board's report:


The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's independent investigation into the February 1, 2003, loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and its seven-member crew lasted nearly seven months.

A staff of more than 120, along with some 400 NASA engineers, supported the board's 13 members. Investigators examined more than 30,000 documents, conducted more than 200 formal interviews, heard testimony from dozens of expert witnesses, and reviewed more than 3,000 inputs from the general public. In addition, more than 25,000 searchers combed vast stretches of the Western United States to retrieve the spacecraft's debris.

In the process, Columbia's tragedy was compounded when two debris searchers with the U.S. Forest Service perished in a helicopter accident. The board recognized early on that the accident was probably not an anomalous, random event, but rather likely rooted to some degree in NASA's history and the human space flight program's culture.

Accordingly, the board broadened its mandate at the outset to include an investigation of a wide range of historical and organizational issues, including political and budgetary considerations, compromises, and changing priorities over the life of the Space Shuttle Program.

The board's conviction regarding the importance of these factors strengthened as the investigation progressed, with the result that this report, in its findings, conclusions, and recommendations, places as much weight on these causal factors as on the more easily understood and corrected physical cause of the accident.

The physical cause of the loss of Columbia and its crew was a breach in the Thermal Protection System on the leading edge of the left wing, caused by a piece of insulating foam which separated from the left bipod ramp section of the External Tank at 81.7 seconds after launch, and struck the wing in the vicinity of the lower half of Reinforced Carbon-Carbon panel number 8.

During re-entry this breach in the Thermal Protection System allowed superheated air to penetrate through the leading edge insulation and progressively melt the aluminum structure of the left wing, resulting in a weakening of the structure until increasing aerodynamic forces caused loss of control, failure of the wing, and break-up of the Orbiter. This breakup occurred in a flight regime in which, given the current design of the Orbiter, there was no possibility for the crew to survive.

The organizational causes of this accident are rooted in the Space Shuttle Program's history and culture, including the original compromises that were required to gain approval for the Shuttle, subsequent years of resource constraints, fluctuating priorities, schedule pressures, mischaracterization of the Shuttle as operational rather than developmental, and lack of an agreed national vision for human space flight.

Cultural traits and organizational practices detrimental to safety were allowed to develop, including: reliance on past success as a substitute for sound engineering practices (such as testing to understand why systems were not performing in accordance with requirements); organizational barriers that prevented effective communication of critical safety information and stifled professional differences of opinion; lack of integrated management across program elements; and the evolution of an informal chain of command and decision-making processes that operated outside the organization's rules.

This report discusses the attributes of an organization that could more safely and reliably operate the inherently risky Space Shuttle, but does not provide a detailed organizational prescription. Among those attributes are: a robust and independent program technical authority that has complete control over specifications and requirements, and waivers to them; an independent safety assurance organization with line authority over all levels of safety oversight; and an organizational culture that reflects the best characteristics of a learning organization.

This report concludes with recommendations, some of which are specifically identified and prefaced as "before return to flight." These recommendations are largely related to the physical cause of the accident, and include preventing the loss of foam, improved imaging of the Space Shuttle stack from liftoff through separation of the External Tank, and on-orbit inspection and repair of the Thermal Protection System.

The remaining recommendations, for the most part, stem from the board's findings on organizational cause factors. While they are not "before return to flight" recommendations, they can be viewed as "continuing to fly" recommendations, as they capture the board's thinking on what changes are necessary to operate the Shuttle and future spacecraft safely in the mid- to long-term.

These recommendations reflect both the board's strong support for return to flight at the earliest date consistent with the overriding objective of safety, and the board's conviction that operation of the Space Shuttle, and all human spaceflight, is a developmental activity with high inherent risks.

[cjolley]

Originally posted by cking4
"Seven astronauts are taking a dirt nap because we caved in to special interests and used the wrong
materials in the construction of the craft" just doesn't quite have the same ring, does it?

It doesn't have the same ring, because it's the WRONG ANSWER!
If they don't fix what's in the report it'll just be something else next time.
chuck

[Brian R.]

Management problem, not engineering problem.

[RedRed]

I just read that 'lost in space' article.... Its appaling.

They obviously have not got the remotest concept of how dangerous ASBESTOS is!


I work in the Health service here in Belfast - for one hundred years or more, asbestos was widely used in the ship building industry.

It doesnt kill on the spot. Your lungs disolve in cancers 40 years later. I have seen the results of asbestosis - its not
theoreticall, or politally correct -

if the company (the ONLY company) stops making it - then you have to change - AFTER appropriate research!

RedRed